The lay follower Citta’s debate with Mahāvīra in the _Nigaṇṭha Sutta_ reflects not just simple polemic, but a fundamental epistemological division between Early Jains and Buddhists. A close reading of the _Ācārāṅga Sūtra_ shows that the Jains see the truth as a property of the self-knowing purified soul that knows all things. For the Buddhists, consciousness is conditioned and dependent. If truth is a property or relation of consciousness, then it too is conditioned and dependent. In order to maintain that (...) truth is the end of the Buddha’s path, Buddhists sever the connection between consciousness and truth by formulating a negative definition of truth. Truth is that which lacks a deceptive nature and accordingly, Nirvāṇa is the ultimate truth. The Buddha’s path culminates in the discovery of truth through the elimination of deception by the annihilation of consciousness, which the Jains hold is impossible because knowledge is essential to the soul. (shrink)

For Plotinus, although the One and the Intellect are transcendent sources of the cosmos, they are also omnipresent within it. At first, the mutual omnipresence and transcendence of the One and the Intellect seem contradictory, but their omnipresence and transcendence are perfectly consistent outcomes of the relation of the cosmos to the One and the Intellect. For the perfection of the One entails both that the One has power to generate and that it is mutually transcendent and omnipresent in the (...) universe. Plotinus extends his principles of perfection, transcendence, and omnipresence to include the relation of the body to the soul by explaining that the soul can transcend the body while the body is within it. Hence, Plotinus is able to fashion an efficient and consistent metaphysics in which Godcontains the universe and the soul contains the body without denying the transcendent perfection of either. (shrink)

Overcoming Uncertainty in Ancient Greek Political Philosophy makes an historical and theoretical contribution by explaining the role of opinion in ancient Greek political philosophy, showing its importance for Aristotle’s theory of deliberation, and indicating a new model for a deliberative republic. Currently, there are no studies of opinion in ancient Greek political theory and so the book breaks new historical ground. The book establishes that opinion is key for the political theories of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics because each sees (...) uncertainty as a problem that needs to be overcome if one is to establish a virtuous polity. Since they have different notions of the nature of the uncertainty of opinion, they develop very different political strategies to overcome it. The book explains that Plato’s and the Stoics’ analyses of uncertainty support oligarchy and monarchy, respectively, and that theoretical support for deliberate politics requires a more nuanced understanding of uncertainty that only Aristotle provides. (shrink)

Aristotle’s brief considerations concerning how we perceive that we perceive led to a long and wide-ranging discussion of the problem by his commentators, one that extended over several centuries. From the second century to the sixth, Aristotle’s ancient Greek commentators, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Pseudo-Simplicius, and Pseudo-Philoponus, offered various interpretations of apperception. The discussion of the problem is historically revealing, for the commentators did not so much attempt to write historically accurate interpretations of the texts upon which they commented; rather, (...) they used the text as an occasion for their own active philosophical reflection. They sought to extract the truth from a revered text. Hence, their commentaries are very helpful in reconstructing the development of philosophical views representative of their own times. Their discussions of self-awareness in perception are of particular interest, because in them we can witness changes in the broader questions of the nature of the self and truth. (shrink)